Michael Schumacher – The strange story of his retirement and the signing of Kimi
(Read the article for more info in how Kimi was also signed for Ferrari)...There was clearly tension between Todt and Montezemolo that weekend in
Monza. On Friday and Saturday, there had been an uneasy peace as both
men went about their business. Then, on race-day, with less than 15
minutes to the start, Montezemolo broke away from Ferrari on the grid
and went up to Räikkönen’s car. He leaned over the cockpit and gave a
thumbs-up sign, as if indicating that all was going to plan. It was a
strange action to pursue with his team’s close competitor at Ferrari’s
home race.
After Schumacher’s race victory, Montezemolo was
delirious with joy and, flanked by Elkann and Marchionne, in the full
glare of television, he embraced Jean Todt and kissed him. But as
Montezemolo kissed him Italian style and threw his arms around his
shoulders, Todt quickly turned away. It resembled the scene in ‘The
Godfather Part III’ when Michael Corleone embraces his brother Fredo
whilst whispering his death sentence. Then it was Michael
Schumacher’s turn. After being pecked by Montezemolo, he too resisted
his boss’s celebratory embraces and looked blankly over his shoulder.
For Montezemolo, as he embraced the two men he knew the press release
signalling his victory was being handed out to journalists.
It was
now clear to insiders that Montezemolo had won his internal battle with
Todt to turn Räikkönen’s option into a firm contract drive for Ferrari
in 2007. And it was clear that Schumacher’s ultimatum of ‘Räikkönen’s
or me’ had been ignored. It was a battle Montezemolo had been
determined to win. Six years earlier, to give the team the very best
chance of winning, he had wanted to hire Mika Häkkinen as team-mate to
Schumacher. But he had been blocked by the twin powers of Schumacher
and Todt. This time he was determined to prevail. He wanted Räikkönen,
and if that meant Schumacher’s departure, then so be it. And he also
made it clear he was not prepared to carry on paying Schumacher his
US$45 million a year in his twilight years. In any case that money was
no longer available, it had been allocated to Räikkönen in a deal
skilfully negotiated by the driver’s manager David Robertson.
In
truth Schumacher was not simply being pushed out of Ferrari, he was not
prepared to carry on under the terms that were being offered. So he
reluctantly decided to retire. And in any event it was good timing – he
was going out at the peak of his powers.
Naturally, in the
circumstances, the two press conferences, first for TV and then for the
press were sad affairs. Schumacher was very morose. He clearly saw no
happiness in retirement. But he played the company line and did not
vent any feelings of being pushed out. That was not Schumacher’s way.
And the timing of the press release before his own announcement had
given him no room for manoeuvre. It was done on the express orders of
Montezemolo to ensure that he, and not Schumacher, was setting the
agenda.
The sense of despair from Schumacher was obvious. He is
the one driver on the grid who genuinely loves Formula One. He lives
and breathes it. Whilst some other multiple world champions have rushed
into retirement, he seemed set to drive on into his 40s. He was clearly
not ready to retire after 16 seasons of racing, nearly double the
average career span and equalling the career of Ricardo Patrese.
But
at the age of 37, he found, like many others, that as far as
Montezemolo was concerned he was past his sell-by date. As Schumacher’s
long-time manager, Willi Weber, woefully observed in a passing comment
to a journalist at Monza: “Michael found he no longer has the power he
thought at Ferrari.” So Schumacher’s retirement was just as
controversial as his entry into the sport at the Belgian Grand Prix in
first practice on Friday 23rd August 1991.
The countdown for
Schumacher’s demise had begun on 25th August 2005 when Räikkönen signed
a one-year option which gave Ferrari the right, within a certain time
period, to employ him, at a salary of around US$45 million, for three
years from 2007 to 2009 with options to renew beyond that. The option
price had never been confirmed but was rumoured around the paddock to
be US$5 million.
Everybody knew that the drivers’ market was
headed for a shake-up in 2007. It became clear that the contracts of
the three best drivers in the world, Schumacher, Räikkönen and Fernando
Alonso were all expiring at the same time – at end of 2006. It was a
unique event in Formula One history and meant that all three could be
driving at different teams in 2007. In normal circumstances one or two
of the top drivers might be out of contract at the same time, but never
three. However, in truth nobody expected any of the three to move from
their incumbent teams. Schumacher was an absolute fixture at Ferrari
and showing no sign of retiring. Alonso was winning everything at
Renault so why would he move, especially as Flavio Briatore, the
Renault team principal, was his manager? And Räikkönen, despite coming
to the end of his contract, had options for the future and really
nowhere else to go.
And that was how it looked in the summer of
2005 as Räikkönen’s manager, David Robertson, and McLaren Mercedes team
principal, Ron Dennis, sat down to discuss the Finnish driver’s future.
It was to be the first of the big driver negotiations for 2007.
As
far as Robertson was concerned, it was all going to be pretty
straightforward. He couldn’t comprehend Räikkönen leaving. The contract
was up but Dennis had options to renew it well into the future. These
options all stemmed from the original contract Räikkönen had signed in
September 2001. Dennis had paid a small fortune to secure Räikkönen’s
services including a rumoured US$14 million to compensate Peter Sauber.
It was a complex contract – two years (2002 and 2003) at a modest
salary and then three years (2004-2006) for a much larger retainer
culminating in the near US$45 million he was being paid in 2006. But
Räikkönen was far from a free agent at the end of his McLaren contract.
By all accounts it was at Dennis’s option to take up another three
years if he was willing to pay an escalating salary.
Dennis had
security, but at a price. There is no way of telling what that price
was but it was likely to mean Räikkönen receiving at least US$60-US$70
million a year by 2009. But Dennis, who had been bamboozled into
agreeing the high price four years before in 2001, just before the 9/11
terrorist attacks when economic conditions had been very different, did
not want to pay, although he still wanted Räikkönen to drive for him.
By
all accounts Robertson was somewhat surprised, even if he didn’t show
it, when Dennis said he wasn’t taking up the option. Although there is
no independent confirmation of this it appears that Dennis believed he
could cancel the option, and thereby his commitment, and open
negotiations with Robertson at a more sensible retainer. After all
Dennis believed, and it certainly looked the case, that Räikkönen had
nowhere else to go.
It appears Dennis genuinely believed Robertson
would simply agree a lower retainer, probably something nearer US$35
million. But it proved Dennis did not know the man at all. Robertson is
an extremely shrewd individual. Even his critics say he can read the
minds of team principals. He is believed to study their psyche in his
spare time so that he can deal with them more effectively. In his short
career in the paddock he has already negotiated with Frank Williams,
Flavio Briatore, Ron Dennis and Jean Todt, and bested all of them.
Anyone
who has had negotiations with him of any kind is aware of his skills.
As one associate says: “He is the sort of man, and this is not said
impolitely, with whom one counts ones fingers after shaking his hand.
He probably secretly relishes that reputation.”
It is important to
emphasise that at that stage of the 2005 season, in spite of
Robertson’s reputation, Dennis thought he held all the cards. Räikkönen
was dominating the latter half of the 2005 season and McLaren was the
top team. Conversely Ferrari was in the doldrums – why would Räikkönen
want to go there even if he could?
And Renault was out of the
equation. Everyone thought Alonso was a fixture at Renault. When Dennis
let Räikkönen’s option lapse he knew, or at least thought he knew, that
he could simply wait for Robertson to accept his offer.
But
Robertson sensed something different. He sensed discontent in the
McLaren organisation, a sense of drift. He had picked up that Adrian
Newey was leaving and that Nick Tombazis might do the same. He also
thought most of Ferrari’s problems were tyre related and solvable; he
knew that Ross Brawn and Rory Byrne had not suddenly become bad
engineers.
But Robertson kept his counsel with Dennis and said he would get back to him.
Robertson
considered his options and marched over to the Ferrari motorhome to get
the lie of the land. He imagined negotiations with Todt alone would be
a waste of time. So he sought to engage Montezemolo and Todt together.
Again the wily operator had picked up their differences on his radar
and thought he might be able to divide and conquer. He was absolutely
correct. Whilst Todt was cool to the idea of hiring Räikkönen,
Montezemolo was more than keen. But there were complications. Ferrari
already had an option with Valentino Rossi and Todt doubted openly that
Schumacher would want Räikkönen alongside him. But Robertson spoke
privately to Montezemolo. Soon the two men agreed to sign Räikkönen to
an option in Ferrari’s favour for a year, and to pay for the privilege.
But Robertson was not out of the woods. At that point he did not
think Ferrari would actually sign Räikkönen. But it was his leverage on
Ron Dennis. Robertson made sure by judicious leaks to journalist
friends that it got around the paddock about Ferrari’s option. Dennis’s
bluff had been publicly called.
And so matters rested, until the
end of the season when Dennis heard on the grapevine that Räikkönen had
signed for Ferrari. Although it was only an option he guessed
immediately what was going on and decided he was not about to be kept
on a string for a year whilst Ferrari decided his future. By then
the situation with the third driver in the loop, Fernando Alonso, was
becoming clouded as rumours spread that Renault would withdraw from
Formula One at the end of 2006. One very highly placed pundit whispered
in Dennis’s ear that he had heard this would definitely happen. As sad
as that might be for Formula One, Dennis realised it was very good news
for him. As the rumour gained currency, whatever its truth, it
effectively put Alonso into play.
Dennis made an approach for
Alonso. He understood, as did everyone else in the paddock, that at
around US$6 million a year, Alonso was underpaid. Dennis offered Alonso
US$16 million a year. The timing of the move was perfect.
At that
point Renault’s prospects for 2007 were at their lowest and McLaren’s,
after its storming season, at their highest. McLaren had also just
announced it had signed Vodafone as title sponsor for 2007; it had more
cash than ever. With all things considered Alonso’s manager Flavio
Briatore had no choice but to advise his driver to accept Dennis’s
offer. He knew Renault at that moment in time would not match it
(although later the situation was to change). Dennis attached one
condition to his offer – he wanted to announce it immediately despite
the disruption it would cause to his existing drivers. Close friends
say he was driven by a desire to get back at David Robertson and tell
the Formula One world how clever he was.
Alonso’s signing was
announced to an unsuspecting world just before Christmas 2005. It
caused a sensation, mainly revolving around Briatore’s position and the
obvious conflict of interest. Briatore took it all in his stride.
Interestingly he and Dennis came up with entirely different stories of
how Alonso was signed. But by then it didn’t matter. After the ravages
inflicted on his bank account by David Robertson, Dennis considered it
a good day’s work to get Alonso for just US$16 million.
But Dennis
had seriously piqued his existing drivers and when they heard the news
both vowed to leave the team at the end of 2006. They felt they had
been double-crossed. Räikkönen’s position for 2007 suddenly looked
precarious.
Kimi
"It is a little
(Read the article for more info in how Kimi was also signed for Ferrari)...There was clearly tension between Todt and Montezemolo that weekend in
Monza. On Friday and Saturday, there had been an uneasy peace as both
men went about their business. Then, on race-day, with less than 15
minutes to the start, Montezemolo broke away from Ferrari on the grid
and went up to Räikkönen’s car. He leaned over the cockpit and gave a
thumbs-up sign, as if indicating that all was going to plan. It was a
strange action to pursue with his team’s close competitor at Ferrari’s
home race.
After Schumacher’s race victory, Montezemolo was
delirious with joy and, flanked by Elkann and Marchionne, in the full
glare of television, he embraced Jean Todt and kissed him. But as
Montezemolo kissed him Italian style and threw his arms around his
shoulders, Todt quickly turned away. It resembled the scene in ‘The
Godfather Part III’ when Michael Corleone embraces his brother Fredo
whilst whispering his death sentence. Then it was Michael
Schumacher’s turn. After being pecked by Montezemolo, he too resisted
his boss’s celebratory embraces and looked blankly over his shoulder.
For Montezemolo, as he embraced the two men he knew the press release
signalling his victory was being handed out to journalists.
It was
now clear to insiders that Montezemolo had won his internal battle with
Todt to turn Räikkönen’s option into a firm contract drive for Ferrari
in 2007. And it was clear that Schumacher’s ultimatum of ‘Räikkönen’s
or me’ had been ignored. It was a battle Montezemolo had been
determined to win. Six years earlier, to give the team the very best
chance of winning, he had wanted to hire Mika Häkkinen as team-mate to
Schumacher. But he had been blocked by the twin powers of Schumacher
and Todt. This time he was determined to prevail. He wanted Räikkönen,
and if that meant Schumacher’s departure, then so be it. And he also
made it clear he was not prepared to carry on paying Schumacher his
US$45 million a year in his twilight years. In any case that money was
no longer available, it had been allocated to Räikkönen in a deal
skilfully negotiated by the driver’s manager David Robertson.
In
truth Schumacher was not simply being pushed out of Ferrari, he was not
prepared to carry on under the terms that were being offered. So he
reluctantly decided to retire. And in any event it was good timing – he
was going out at the peak of his powers.
Naturally, in the
circumstances, the two press conferences, first for TV and then for the
press were sad affairs. Schumacher was very morose. He clearly saw no
happiness in retirement. But he played the company line and did not
vent any feelings of being pushed out. That was not Schumacher’s way.
And the timing of the press release before his own announcement had
given him no room for manoeuvre. It was done on the express orders of
Montezemolo to ensure that he, and not Schumacher, was setting the
agenda.
The sense of despair from Schumacher was obvious. He is
the one driver on the grid who genuinely loves Formula One. He lives
and breathes it. Whilst some other multiple world champions have rushed
into retirement, he seemed set to drive on into his 40s. He was clearly
not ready to retire after 16 seasons of racing, nearly double the
average career span and equalling the career of Ricardo Patrese.
But
at the age of 37, he found, like many others, that as far as
Montezemolo was concerned he was past his sell-by date. As Schumacher’s
long-time manager, Willi Weber, woefully observed in a passing comment
to a journalist at Monza: “Michael found he no longer has the power he
thought at Ferrari.” So Schumacher’s retirement was just as
controversial as his entry into the sport at the Belgian Grand Prix in
first practice on Friday 23rd August 1991.
The countdown for
Schumacher’s demise had begun on 25th August 2005 when Räikkönen signed
a one-year option which gave Ferrari the right, within a certain time
period, to employ him, at a salary of around US$45 million, for three
years from 2007 to 2009 with options to renew beyond that. The option
price had never been confirmed but was rumoured around the paddock to
be US$5 million.
Everybody knew that the drivers’ market was
headed for a shake-up in 2007. It became clear that the contracts of
the three best drivers in the world, Schumacher, Räikkönen and Fernando
Alonso were all expiring at the same time – at end of 2006. It was a
unique event in Formula One history and meant that all three could be
driving at different teams in 2007. In normal circumstances one or two
of the top drivers might be out of contract at the same time, but never
three. However, in truth nobody expected any of the three to move from
their incumbent teams. Schumacher was an absolute fixture at Ferrari
and showing no sign of retiring. Alonso was winning everything at
Renault so why would he move, especially as Flavio Briatore, the
Renault team principal, was his manager? And Räikkönen, despite coming
to the end of his contract, had options for the future and really
nowhere else to go.
And that was how it looked in the summer of
2005 as Räikkönen’s manager, David Robertson, and McLaren Mercedes team
principal, Ron Dennis, sat down to discuss the Finnish driver’s future.
It was to be the first of the big driver negotiations for 2007.
As
far as Robertson was concerned, it was all going to be pretty
straightforward. He couldn’t comprehend Räikkönen leaving. The contract
was up but Dennis had options to renew it well into the future. These
options all stemmed from the original contract Räikkönen had signed in
September 2001. Dennis had paid a small fortune to secure Räikkönen’s
services including a rumoured US$14 million to compensate Peter Sauber.
It was a complex contract – two years (2002 and 2003) at a modest
salary and then three years (2004-2006) for a much larger retainer
culminating in the near US$45 million he was being paid in 2006. But
Räikkönen was far from a free agent at the end of his McLaren contract.
By all accounts it was at Dennis’s option to take up another three
years if he was willing to pay an escalating salary.
Dennis had
security, but at a price. There is no way of telling what that price
was but it was likely to mean Räikkönen receiving at least US$60-US$70
million a year by 2009. But Dennis, who had been bamboozled into
agreeing the high price four years before in 2001, just before the 9/11
terrorist attacks when economic conditions had been very different, did
not want to pay, although he still wanted Räikkönen to drive for him.
By
all accounts Robertson was somewhat surprised, even if he didn’t show
it, when Dennis said he wasn’t taking up the option. Although there is
no independent confirmation of this it appears that Dennis believed he
could cancel the option, and thereby his commitment, and open
negotiations with Robertson at a more sensible retainer. After all
Dennis believed, and it certainly looked the case, that Räikkönen had
nowhere else to go.
It appears Dennis genuinely believed Robertson
would simply agree a lower retainer, probably something nearer US$35
million. But it proved Dennis did not know the man at all. Robertson is
an extremely shrewd individual. Even his critics say he can read the
minds of team principals. He is believed to study their psyche in his
spare time so that he can deal with them more effectively. In his short
career in the paddock he has already negotiated with Frank Williams,
Flavio Briatore, Ron Dennis and Jean Todt, and bested all of them.
Anyone
who has had negotiations with him of any kind is aware of his skills.
As one associate says: “He is the sort of man, and this is not said
impolitely, with whom one counts ones fingers after shaking his hand.
He probably secretly relishes that reputation.”
It is important to
emphasise that at that stage of the 2005 season, in spite of
Robertson’s reputation, Dennis thought he held all the cards. Räikkönen
was dominating the latter half of the 2005 season and McLaren was the
top team. Conversely Ferrari was in the doldrums – why would Räikkönen
want to go there even if he could?
And Renault was out of the
equation. Everyone thought Alonso was a fixture at Renault. When Dennis
let Räikkönen’s option lapse he knew, or at least thought he knew, that
he could simply wait for Robertson to accept his offer.
But
Robertson sensed something different. He sensed discontent in the
McLaren organisation, a sense of drift. He had picked up that Adrian
Newey was leaving and that Nick Tombazis might do the same. He also
thought most of Ferrari’s problems were tyre related and solvable; he
knew that Ross Brawn and Rory Byrne had not suddenly become bad
engineers.
But Robertson kept his counsel with Dennis and said he would get back to him.
Robertson
considered his options and marched over to the Ferrari motorhome to get
the lie of the land. He imagined negotiations with Todt alone would be
a waste of time. So he sought to engage Montezemolo and Todt together.
Again the wily operator had picked up their differences on his radar
and thought he might be able to divide and conquer. He was absolutely
correct. Whilst Todt was cool to the idea of hiring Räikkönen,
Montezemolo was more than keen. But there were complications. Ferrari
already had an option with Valentino Rossi and Todt doubted openly that
Schumacher would want Räikkönen alongside him. But Robertson spoke
privately to Montezemolo. Soon the two men agreed to sign Räikkönen to
an option in Ferrari’s favour for a year, and to pay for the privilege.
But Robertson was not out of the woods. At that point he did not
think Ferrari would actually sign Räikkönen. But it was his leverage on
Ron Dennis. Robertson made sure by judicious leaks to journalist
friends that it got around the paddock about Ferrari’s option. Dennis’s
bluff had been publicly called.
And so matters rested, until the
end of the season when Dennis heard on the grapevine that Räikkönen had
signed for Ferrari. Although it was only an option he guessed
immediately what was going on and decided he was not about to be kept
on a string for a year whilst Ferrari decided his future. By then
the situation with the third driver in the loop, Fernando Alonso, was
becoming clouded as rumours spread that Renault would withdraw from
Formula One at the end of 2006. One very highly placed pundit whispered
in Dennis’s ear that he had heard this would definitely happen. As sad
as that might be for Formula One, Dennis realised it was very good news
for him. As the rumour gained currency, whatever its truth, it
effectively put Alonso into play.
Dennis made an approach for
Alonso. He understood, as did everyone else in the paddock, that at
around US$6 million a year, Alonso was underpaid. Dennis offered Alonso
US$16 million a year. The timing of the move was perfect.
At that
point Renault’s prospects for 2007 were at their lowest and McLaren’s,
after its storming season, at their highest. McLaren had also just
announced it had signed Vodafone as title sponsor for 2007; it had more
cash than ever. With all things considered Alonso’s manager Flavio
Briatore had no choice but to advise his driver to accept Dennis’s
offer. He knew Renault at that moment in time would not match it
(although later the situation was to change). Dennis attached one
condition to his offer – he wanted to announce it immediately despite
the disruption it would cause to his existing drivers. Close friends
say he was driven by a desire to get back at David Robertson and tell
the Formula One world how clever he was.
Alonso’s signing was
announced to an unsuspecting world just before Christmas 2005. It
caused a sensation, mainly revolving around Briatore’s position and the
obvious conflict of interest. Briatore took it all in his stride.
Interestingly he and Dennis came up with entirely different stories of
how Alonso was signed. But by then it didn’t matter. After the ravages
inflicted on his bank account by David Robertson, Dennis considered it
a good day’s work to get Alonso for just US$16 million.
But Dennis
had seriously piqued his existing drivers and when they heard the news
both vowed to leave the team at the end of 2006. They felt they had
been double-crossed. Räikkönen’s position for 2007 suddenly looked
precarious.
Kimi
Raikkonen was left disappointed with third place in the Malaysian Grand
Prix which meant he lost the lead in the drivers’ championship to
race-winner Fernando Alonso. While the next race is this weekend in
Bahrain, Raikkonen expects the balance to be quite similar between
Ferrari and McLaren, but he is resting assured that a big update is on
its way for his car in time for the Spanish Grand Prix.
"It is a little
bit disappointing, but it is the early part of the season, but we did
the best we could in the situation we were in and so the team did very
well, I think, a very good job," Raikkonen said. "We knew when we came
here we had some handicaps. So, I think we maximised our speed, but we
wanted to win and be top of the table – but we did the best we could
here and we just need to work better in the next races and in the
coming weeks and improve the car. I think we have some big improvements
coming, but probably not next race, but for Barcelona it should be
ready."
FreshF1.com – Raikkonen ran with a `castrated` engine in Malaysia
According what Marca found out, Kimi Raikkonen had an engined limited
to 17,500 r.p.m. for all the race, whereas the rest were using 19,000
in normal conditions. This can sound Chinese, but according to the
experienced engineers of the ‘F1 circus’, the loss of 100 rpm in a
current Formula 1 engine means a 5 Horse Power loss.. Therefore, the
Finnish pilot lost about 75 HP with respect to both McLaren and his
teammate, which did not allow him to be on the pace in many phases of
the race. In addition, he had to use less downforce to gain top speed,
which did not allow him to attack the car of ahead under braking.
The last third of the race was his best; he almost managed to catch
Hamilton, although compared to Alonso his lap times were not better.
“We knew that our engine was not running at one hundred percent, but we
had to assure ourselves we finished. We were not perfect meaning we did
not take stupid risks “, the Finn said.
The debate is also centered on knowing what would have happened if
the decision to change the engine had not been taken. Many think that
the position of Kimi would had been the same one in the end if had
started from 13th on the grid.
Source: Marca
Kimi drove a great race at last year’s Bahrain GP with McLaren. After a dreadful qualifying result from a rear suspension failure, Kimi started the race from the back and finished on the podium with a 3rd place.
Don’t miss the Malaysian GP Video I made, for F1 and Kimi fans!
FUCK ISRAEL 
Kimi Raikkonen Space – How Kimi got to Ferrari, News & Video, Barcelona revival for Kimi, Raikkonen ran with a ‘castrated’ engine in Malaysia…
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